Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Prress (1990)
AbstractMathematicians tend to think of themselves as scientists investigating the features of real mathematical things, and the wildly successful application of mathematics in the physical sciences reinforces this picture of mathematics as an objective study. For philosophers, however, this realism about mathematics raises serious questions: What are mathematical things? Where are they? How do we know about them? Offering a scrupulously fair treatment of both mathematical and philosophical concerns, Penelope Maddy here delineates and defends a novel version of mathematical realism. She answers the traditional questions and poses a challenging new one, refocusing philosophical attention on the pressing foundational issues of contemporary mathematics.
Perception and Intuition
Begins with a presentation and elaboration of Benacerraf's epistemic challenge to realism: how can we gain knowledge of an acausal world of non‐spatio‐temporal abstracts? I then outline a theory of perception based in part on neurological theories of Hebb and developmental evidence from Pi... see more
Similar books and articles
Reflections on mathematics.Edward N. Zalta - 2007 - In V. F. Hendricks & Hannes Leitgeb (eds.), Philosophy of Mathematics: Five Questions. Automatic Press/VIP.
Scientific vs. mathematical realism: The indispensability argument.Michael Resnik - 1995 - Philosophia Mathematica 3 (2):166-174.
Towards a Philosophy of Applied Mathematics.Christopher Pincock - 2009 - In Otávio Bueno & Øystein Linnebo (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Philosophy of Mathematics.Christopher Pincock - 2011 - In J. Saatsi & S. French (eds.), Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Continuum. pp. 314-333.
Confirmation and the indispensability of mathematics to science.Susan Vineberg - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):263.
A Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Mathematics.Charles Sayward - 2005 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (2):55-69.
Some naturalistic reflections on set theoretic method.Penelope J. Maddy - 2001 - Topoi 20 (1):17-27.
Mathematics as a Science of Patterns.Michael David Resnik - 1997 - Oxford, England: New York ;Oxford University Press.
Stewart Shapiro. Philosophy of mathematics: Structure and ontology.O. Linnebo - 2003 - Philosophia Mathematica 11 (1):92-103.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science.Tim van Gelder - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):615-28.
An Aristotelian Realist Philosophy of Mathematics: Mathematics as the science of quantity and structure.James Franklin - 2014 - London and New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
References found in this work
No references found.