Noûs 49 (1):55-70 (2015)

Authors
Rory Madden
University College London
Abstract
What does our naïve conception of a conscious subject demand of the nature of conscious beings? In a series of recent papers David Barnett has argued that a range of powerful intuitions in the philosophy of mind are best explained by the hypothesis that our naïve conception imposes a requirement of mereological simplicity on the nature of conscious beings. It is argued here that there is a much more plausible explanation of the intuitions in question. Our naïve conception of a conscious subject imposes a requirement of topological integrity
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/nous.12002
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,703
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter M. Simons - 1987 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Parts : a Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1987 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2:277-279.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Unrestricted Animalism and the Too Many Candidates Problem.Eric Yang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):635-652.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Critique of Dretske’s Conception of State Consciousness.A. Minh Nguyen - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):187-206.
Unity of Consciousness and the Self.David M. Rosenthal - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):325-352.
Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.
Self‐Awareness and the Mind‐Brain Problem.Gilberto Gomes - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):155-65.
Revelation and the Nature of Colour.Keith Allen - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (2):153-176.
Subjectivity in Heterophenomenology.Gianfranco Soldati - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):89-98.
The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.
Disjunctivism.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Oxford Annotated Bibliographies Online.
A Theory of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.
Brains Are Not Conscious.John L. Tienson - 1987 - Philosophical Papers 16 (November):187-93.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-10-26

Total views
110 ( #100,976 of 2,462,489 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,311 of 2,462,489 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes