The Road to Substance Dualism

Abstract
The common materialist view that a functional account of intentionality will eventually be produced is rejected, as is the notion that intentional states are multiply realisable. It is argued also that, contrary to what many materialists have held, the causation of behaviour by intentional states rules out the possibility of a complete explanation of human behaviour in physical terms, and that this points to substance dualism. Kant's criticism of the Cartesian self as a substance, endorsed by P. F. Strawson, rests on a misinterpretation of Descartes. The so-called , which Kim sees to be the crucial objection to substance dualism, is examined, and Kim's arguments are rejected
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DOI 10.1017/S1358246110000111
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References found in this work BETA
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
The Bounds of Sense.P. F. Strawson - 1967 - Philosophy 42 (162):379-382.

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