Demonstrative induction and the skeleton of inference

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P. D. Magnus
State University of New York, Albany
Abstract
It has been common wisdom for centuries that scientific inference cannot be deductive; if it is inference at all, it must be a distinctive kind of inductive inference. According to demonstrative theories of induction, however, important scientific inferences are not inductive in the sense of requiring ampliative inference rules at all. Rather, they are deductive inferences with sufficiently strong premises. General considerations about inferences suffice to show that there is no difference in justification between an inference construed demonstratively or ampliatively. The inductive risk may be shouldered by premises or rules, but it cannot be shirked. Demonstrative theories of induction might, nevertheless, better describe scientific practice. And there may be good methodological reasons for constructing our inferences one way rather than the other. By exploring the limits of these possible advantages, I argue that scientific inference is neither of essence deductive nor of essence inductive
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DOI 10.1080/02698590802567373
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Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 2004 - Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.
The Logic of Reliable Inquiry.Kevin Kelly - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
A Material Theory of Induction.John D. Norton - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.

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