Topoi:1-12 (forthcoming)

Tricia Magalotti
Universita' degli Studi di Pavia
Uriah Kriegel
Rice University
Emotions seem to be epistemically assessable: fear of an onrushing truck is epistemically justified, mutatis mutandis, whereas fear of a peanut rolling on the floor is not. But there is a difficulty in understanding why emotions are epistemically assessable. It is clear why beliefs, for instance, are epistemically assessable: epistemic assessability is, arguably, assessability with respect to likely truth, and belief is by its nature concerned with truth; truth is, we might say, belief’s “formal object.” Emotions, however, have formal objects different from truth: the formal object of fear is danger, the formal object of indignation is injustice, the formal object of grief is loss, and so on. After considering how a number of different accounts of emotion might account for the epistemic assessability of emotion, we develop a novel account of the domain of the epistemically assessable, according to which any mental state which is constitutively evidence-responsive is epistemically assessable, regardless of whether its formal object is truth.
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-021-09738-1
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
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The Rationality of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
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