Analysis 80 (4):674-683 (2021)

Authors
P. D. Magnus
State University of New York, Albany
Abstract
A considerable literature has grown up around the claim of Uniqueness, according to which evidence rationally determines belief. It is opposed to Permissivism, according to which evidence underdetermines belief. This paper highlights an overlooked third possibility, according to which there is no rational doxastic attitude. I call this 'Nihilism'. I argue that adherents of the other two positions ought to reject it but that it might, nevertheless, obtain at least sometimes.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anaa007
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Epistemic Permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
Suspended Judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.

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