Inductions, Red Herrings, and the Best Explanation for the Mixed Record of Science

Abstract
Kyle Stanford has recently claimed to offer a new challenge to scientific realism. Taking his inspiration from the familiar Pessimistic Induction (PI), Stanford proposes a New Induction (NI). Contra Anjan Chakravartty’s suggestion that the NI is a ‘red herring’, I argue that it reveals something deep and important about science. The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, which lies at the heart of the NI, yields a richer anti-realism than the PI. It explains why science falls short when it falls short, and so it might figure in the most coherent account of scientific practice. However, this best account will be antirealist in some respects and about some theories. It will not be a sweeping antirealism about all or most of science
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/bjps/axq004
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,840
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
What is Scientific Progress?Alexander Bird - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):64–89.
Refusing the Devil's Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?P. Kyle Stanford - 2001 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S1-.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Historical Inductions, Old and New.Juha Saatsi - forthcoming - Synthese:1-15.
The Problem of Unconceived Objections.Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Argumentation 28 (4):425-436.
Global and Local Pessimistic Meta-Inductions.Samuel Ruhmkorff - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):409-428.
Expanding Our Grasp: Causal Knowledge and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.Matthias Egg - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):115-141.
Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived Objections.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (1):59-68.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Darwin's Pangenesis and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.P. K. Stanford - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):121-144.
Are Unconceived Alternatives a Problem for Scientific Realism?Michael Devitt - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (2):285-293.
Abduction by Classification and Assembly.John R. Josephson, B. Chandrasekaran, Jack W. Smith & Michael C. Tanner - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:458 - 470.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-08-11

Total downloads

125 ( #39,245 of 2,178,255 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #316,623 of 2,178,255 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums