Authors
P. D. Magnus
State University of New York, Albany
Abstract
Kyle Stanford has recently claimed to offer a new challenge to scientific realism. Taking his inspiration from the familiar Pessimistic Induction (PI), Stanford proposes a New Induction (NI). Contra Anjan Chakravartty’s suggestion that the NI is a ‘red herring’, I argue that it reveals something deep and important about science. The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, which lies at the heart of the NI, yields a richer anti-realism than the PI. It explains why science falls short when it falls short, and so it might figure in the most coherent account of scientific practice. However, this best account will be antirealist in some respects and about some theories. It will not be a sweeping antirealism about all or most of science
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axq004
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References found in this work BETA

Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy.P. D. Magnus & Craig Callender - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (3):320-338.
What is Scientific Progress?Alexander Bird - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):64–89.

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Citations of this work BETA

Scientific Realism.Richard Boyd - 1984 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 21 (1&2):767-791.
Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-Picking.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (2):129-148.
Realism and the Absence of Rivals.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2427-2446.
Scientific Realism.Anjan Chakravartty - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Expanding Our Grasp: Causal Knowledge and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.Matthias Egg - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):115-141.

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Darwin's Pangenesis and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.P. Kyle Stanford - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):121-144.
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Abduction by Classification and Assembly.John R. Josephson, B. Chandrasekaran, Jack W. Smith & Michael C. Tanner - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:458 - 470.

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