Topoi 17 (2):97-105 (1998)

Authors
Tito Magri
Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza
Abstract
Negative freedom (as opposed to positive freedom) has been widely considered an inherently non problematic notion. This paper attempts to show that, if considered as a good with a minimally objective structure, negative freedom can disrupt the capacity for deliberating in a substantively (that is, non purely formal, decision-theoretic) rational way. The argument turns on the notion of non-satiation, as a property of the objective value of some goods of not changing when the availability of the good is increased. Two classes of non-satiating goods are distinguished, one of which has disruptive consequences for rational deliberation. Negative freedom belongs to this last class; and its non-satiating conceptual nature is defended by means of a simple dispositional analysis of value. It is suggested that also rationality itself can be regarded as a non-satiating good that can disrupt deliberation.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Philosophy of Science   Philosophy of Technology
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1006074426629
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