Authors
P. D. Magnus
State University of New York, Albany
Abstract
Philip Kitcher develops the Galilean Strategy to defend realism against its many opponents. I explore the structure of the Galilean Strategy and consider it specifically as an instrument against constructive empiricism. Kitcher claims that the Galilean Strategy underwrites an inference from success to truth. We should resist that conclusion, I argue, but the Galilean Strategy should lead us by other routes to believe in many things about which the empiricist would rather remain agnostic. 1 Target: empiricism 2 The Galilean Strategy 3 Strengthening the argument 4 Success and truth 5 Conclusion.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/54.3.465
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References found in this work BETA

The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
The Scientific Image.Michael Friedman - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (5):274-283.
Science as Social Knowledge.Sharon L. Crasnow - 1992 - Hypatia 8 (3):194-201.

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Citations of this work BETA

Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy.P. D. Magnus & Craig Callender - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (3):320-338.
Ciencia, realidad y racionalidad.Howard Sankey - 2015 - University of Cauca Press.
Ciencia, Sentido Comun Y Realidad.Howard Sankey - 2010 - Discusiones Filosóficas 11 (16):41-58.

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