There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes

Mind 127 (507):779-805 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A dogma of contemporary ethical theory maintains that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is the very same as the nature of normative support for actions. The prevailing view is that normative reasons provide the support across the board. I argue that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is importantly different from the nature of normative support for actions. Actions are indeed supported by reasons. Reasons are gradable and contributory. The support relations for affective attitudes are neither. So-called reasons of the right kind for affective attitudes are facts that make those very attitudes fitting. Unlike reasons, fit-making facts for affective attitudes do not conflict with each other or combine in the explanation of further normative facts. More fit-making facts just make a more complex set of reactions fitting. This result undermines various analyses and unity theses in the philosophy of normativity.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,247

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Affective Deliberation: Toward a Humean Account of Practical Reasons.Stephanie Beardman - 2000 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
Contrastive Reasons.Justin Snedegar - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.
Argumentation and the Force of Reasons.Robert C. Pinto - 2009 - Informal Logic 29 (3):268-295.
Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions.Paul K. Moser - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.
Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions.Paul K. Moser - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.
Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17-26.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
In Defense of the Wrong Kind of Reason.Christopher Howard - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):53-62.
Motivating Reason to Slow the Factive Turn in Epistemology.J. Drake - forthcoming - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-22.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-08-02

Downloads
210 (#58,300)

6 months
4 (#171,088)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Barry Maguire
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.
On Liking Aesthetic Value.Keren Gorodeisky - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):261-280.
Fittingness.Christopher Howard - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12542.
A Perceptual Theory of Hope.Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.

View all 40 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

View all 55 references / Add more references