Erkenntnis 34 (2):171 - 185 (1991)

Russell has recently been held to have had a modal logic, a full modal theory and a view of naming that anticipates Kripke's intuitions on rigid designation. It is argued here that no such claims are warranted. While Russell was not altogether silent on matters modal, he did not advance an identifiable modal logic or anything more than a modest modal theory. His view of naming involves a notion of guaranteed reference. But what Kripke's intuitions about rigidity primarily pertain to is fixed reference, something demonstrably different.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00385719
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Ways of Understanding Hugh MacColl's Concept of Symbolic Existence.Shahid Rahman - 1998 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 3:35-58.
Russell and MacColl: Reply to Grattan-Guinness, Wolen Ski, and Read.Modal Logic - 2001 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):21-42.

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