Synthese 148 (2):295-301 (2006)

Authors
P. D. Magnus
State University of New York, Albany
Abstract
The problem of underdetermination is thought to hold important lessons for philosophy of science. Yet, as Kyle Stanford has recently argued, typical treatments of it offer only restatements of familiar philosophical problems. Following suggestions in Duhem and Sklar, Stanford calls for a New Induction from the history of science. It will provide proof, he thinks, of "the kind of underdetermination that the history of science reveals to be a distinctive and genuine threat to even our best scientific theories" . This paper examines Stanford's New Induction and argues that it -- like the other forms of underdetermination that he criticizes -- merely recapitulates familiar philosophical conundra
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-004-6223-5
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination.Larry Laudan & Jarrett Leplin - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (9):449-472.
Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy.P. D. Magnus & Craig Callender - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (3):320-338.
Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology.Richard Boyd - 1980 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:613-662.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-Picking.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (2):129-148.
In Defense of the Epistemic Imperative.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (4):435-446.
Expanding Our Grasp: Causal Knowledge and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.Matthias Egg - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):115-141.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Herbrand's Theorem and Term Induction.Matthias Baaz & Georg Moser - 2006 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 45 (4):447-503.
Some Problems of Counter‐Inductive Policy as Opposed to Inductive.Audun Öfsti - 1962 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 5 (1-4):267-283.
No Need to Justify Induction Generally.Kazuyoshi Kamiyama - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:105-111.
Induction and Objectivity.F. John Clendinnen - 1966 - Philosophy of Science 33 (3):215-229.
O indukcji niezupełnej w matematyce.Lech Gruszecki - 2005 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 53 (2):47-72.
The Role of Parameters in Bar Rule and Bar Induction.Michael Rathjen - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (2):715-730.
On Probabilism and Induction.John Hosack - 1991 - Topoi 10 (2):227-229.
Induction and Inference to the Best Explanation.Ruth Weintraub - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):203-216.
The Last Word on Induction?Colin Howson - 1991 - Erkenntnis 34 (1):73 - 82.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
265 ( #36,897 of 2,455,615 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #73,628 of 2,455,615 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes