What SPECIES can teach us about THEORY
This paper argues against the common, often implicit view that theories are some specific kind of thing. Instead, I argue for theory concept pluralism: There are multiple distinct theory concepts which we legitimately use in different domains and for different purposes, and we should not expect this to change. The argument goes by analogy with species concept pluralism, a familiar position in philosophy of biology. I conclude by considering some consequences for philosophy of science if theory concept pluralism is correct.
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Philosophical Problems, Cluster Concepts, and the Many Lives of Molyneux's Question.Brian R. Glenney - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (3):541-558.
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