Depragmatized dutch book arguments

Philosophy of Science 64 (2):291-305 (1997)
Abstract
Recently a number of authors have tried to avoid the failures of traditional Dutch book arguments by separating them from pragmatic concerns of avoiding a sure loss. In this paper I examine defenses of this kind by Howson and Urbach, Hellman, and Christensen. I construct rigorous explications of their arguments and show that they are not cogent. I advocate abandoning Dutch book arguments in favor of a representation theorem
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DOI 10.1086/392552
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Scotching Dutch Books?Alan Hajek - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):139-151.
Foundations of Probability.Rachael Briggs - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-16.
Logic with Numbers.Colin Howson - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):491-512.

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