Philosophy of Science 59 (1):120-141 (1992)

Abstract
This is an essay in the Bayesian theory of how opinions should be revised over time. It begins with a discussion of the principle that van Fraassen has dubbed "Reflection". This principle is not a requirement of rationality; a diachronic Dutch argument, that purports to show the contrary, is fallacious. But under suitable conditions, it is irrational to actually implement shifts in probability that violate Reflection. Conditionalization and probability kinematics are special cases of the principle not to implement shifts that violate Reflection; hence these principles are also requirements of rationality under suitable conditions, though not universal requirements of rationality
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DOI 10.1086/289657
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References found in this work BETA

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - University of Chicago Press.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
Conditionalization and Observation.Paul Teller - 1973 - Synthese 26 (2):218-258.
Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs.David Christensen - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.

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Citations of this work BETA

Abduction.Igor Douven - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Distorted Reflection.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85.
Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
Risk Aversion and the Long Run.Johanna Thoma - 2018 - Ethics 129 (2):230-253.

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