Philosophical Studies:1-21 (2016)

Authors
Anna Mahtani
London School of Economics
Abstract
This paper is about the standard Reflection Principle :235–256, 1984) and the Group Reflection Principle :478–502, 2007; Bovens and Rabinowicz in Episteme 8:281–300, 2011; Titelbaum in Quitting certainties: a Bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief, OUP, Oxford, 2012; Hedden in Mind 124:449–491, 2015). I argue that these principles are incomplete as they stand. The key point is that deference is an intensional relation, and so whether you are rationally required to defer to a person at a time can depend on how that person and that time are designated. In this paper I suggest a way of completing the Reflection Principle and Group Reflection Principle, and I argue that so completed these principles are plausible. In particular, they do not fall foul of the Sleeping Beauty case :143–147, 2000), the Cable Guy Paradox :112–119, 2005), Arntzenius’ prisoner cases :356–370, 2003), or the Puzzle of the Hats :281–300, 2011)
Keywords the reflection principle  sleeping beuaty  deference
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0675-6
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,340
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.
De Se Beliefs and Centred Uncertainty.Silvia Milano - 2018 - Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science
Basic‐Know And Super‐Know.Anna Mahtani - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):375-391.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Deference Done Right.Richard Pettigrew & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-19.
Reflection and Self‐Trust.Aaron Bronfman - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):75-82.
Deference and Description.Aaron Bronfman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1333-1353.
Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.
Self‐Respect Regained.Adam Rieger Jake Chandler - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):311-318.
Self-Respect Regained.Jake Chandler & Adam Rieger - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):311-318.
Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge.Jonathan Weisberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):179-197.
Rescuing Reflection.Ilho Park - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (4):473-489.
Semistationary and Stationary Reflection.Hiroshi Sakai - 2008 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 73 (1):181-192.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-04-16

Total views
106 ( #101,413 of 2,448,745 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #224,186 of 2,448,745 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes