Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6):593 - 616 (2010)

Abstract
Inductive probability is the logical concept of probability in ordinary language. It is vague but it can be explicated by defining a clear and precise concept that can serve some of the same purposes. This paper presents a general method for doing such an explication and then a particular explication due to Carnap. Common criticisms of Carnap's inductive logic are examined; it is shown that most of them are spurious and the others are not fundamental
Keywords Inductive probability  Explication  Carnap
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-010-9144-4
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References found in this work BETA

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Meaning and Necessity.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - University of Chicago Press.
Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Citations of this work BETA

Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Experimental Explication.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):672-710.
Explicating Formal Epistemology: Carnap's Legacy as Jeffrey's Radical Probabilism.Christopher F. French - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:33–42.
A Note on Irrelevance in Inductive Logic.Jeff B. Paris & Alena Vencovská - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (3):357 - 370.

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