Inductive logic and the ravens paradox

Philosophy of Science 66 (1):50-70 (1999)
Hempel's paradox of the ravens arises from the inconsistency of three prima facie plausible principles of confirmation. This paper uses Carnapian inductive logic to (a) identify which of the principles is false, (b) give insight into why this principle is false, and (c) identify a true principle that is sufficiently similar to the false one that failure to distinguish the two might explain why the false principle is prima facie plausible. This solution to the paradox is compared with a variety of other responses and is shown to differ from all of them.
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DOI 10.1086/392676
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The Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
“The Ravens Paradox” is a Misnomer.Roger Clarke - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):427-440.
Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.

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