Imprecise Probabilities and Unstable Betting Behaviour

Noûs 52 (1):69-87 (2018)
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Abstract

Many have argued that a rational agent's attitude towards a proposition may be better represented by a probability range than by a single number. I show that in such cases an agent will have unstable betting behaviour, and so will behave in an unpredictable way. I use this point to argue against a range of responses to the ‘two bets’ argument for sharp probabilities.

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Author's Profile

Anna Mahtani
London School of Economics

References found in this work

Morals by Agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - London and New York: Routledge.
Truth and Probability.Frank Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):921-928.

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