Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism

Philosophy of Science 69 (1):73-81 (2002)
Abstract
James Joyce's 'Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism' gives a new argument for the conclusion that a person's credences ought to satisfy the laws of probability. The premises of Joyce's argument include six axioms about what counts as an adequate measure of the distance of a credence function from the truth. This paper shows that (a) Joyce's argument for one of these axioms is invalid, (b) his argument for another axiom has a false premise, (c) neither axiom is plausible, and (d) without these implausible axioms Joyce's vindication of probabilism fails.
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DOI 10.1086/338941
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How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.
Immoderately Rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.
Arguments for–or Against–Probabilism?A. Hajek - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.
Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs.Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):384-395.
You’Ve Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-18.

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