Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):129-140 (2010)
AbstractIn his Responsibility and the moral sentiments , Wallace develops the idea that we should think of what it is to be morally responsible for an act in terms of norms for holding someone responsible for that act. Smith has recently claimed that Wallace's approach and those like it are 'fundamentally misguided'. She says that such approaches make the mistake of incorporating conditions for 'actively blaming' others into the basic conditions for being responsible, when in fact the conditions for active blame 'go beyond' the basic conditions. In this essay, I argue that Smith's otherwise illuminating discussion of these 'Normativist' approaches does not undermine them. Specifically, I maintain that being actively blamable by certain persons with the relevant standing is actually constitutive of being responsible for at least some acts. By distinguishing between persons with different sorts of standing, a Normativist approach can avoid Smith's challenge. My larger aim is thus to clarify and defend the Normativist approach
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References found in this work
The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability.Stephen Darwall - 1996 - Harvard University Press.
Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1984 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work
Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Another Reply to Zimmerman.Benjamin De Mesel - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (1):77-92.
Grounding Responsibility in Appropriate Blame.Leonhard Menges - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):15-24.
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