Proceduralism and Justification in Habermas’s Discourse Ethics

Philosophy Today 46 (3):300-311 (2002)
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Abstract

I argue that Habermas's conception of moral justification cannot be proceduralist in the way he claims that it is if discourse ethics is to remain a version of Kantian ethics. This argument is supported by two claims. The first is that Habermas claims there are no substantive constraints on moral argument. The second is that discourse ethics requires the substantive constraint of moral respect where moral respect is understood to be a preprocedural norm to which all moral claims are accountable

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Jon Mahoney
Kansas State University

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