Williamson on inexact knowledge

Philosophical Studies 139 (2):171 - 180 (2008)

Anna Mahtani
London School of Economics And Political Science
Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through. The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.
Keywords Vagueness  Inexact knowledge  Epistemic theory  Williamson  Margin for error  Reliabilism
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Reprint years 2016, 2017
DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9109-9
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Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.
Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
Easy Possibilities.R. M. Sainsbury - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):907-919.

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Inexact Knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 1992 - Mind 101 (402):217-242.
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