Sophia 43 (2):15-28 (2004)
According to divine-command metaethics (DCM), whatever is morally good or right has that status because, and only because, it conforms to God’s will. I argue that DCM is false or vacuous: either DCM is false, or else there are no instantiated moral properties, and no moral truths, to which DCM can even apply. The sort of criticism I offer is familiar, but I develop it in what I believe is a novel way.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Richard Joyce's New Objections to the Divine Command Theory.Scott Hill - 2010 - Journal of Religious Ethics 38 (1):189-196.
Similar books and articles
A Critique of Graber's Divine Command Theory of Ethics.John P. Reeder Jr - 1975 - Journal of Religious Ethics 3 (1):157 - 163.
Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1979 - Journal of Religious Ethics 7 (1):66 - 79.
Divine Simplicity and Divine Command Ethics.Susan Peppers-Bates - 2008 - International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (3):361-369.
Divine Command Morality and the Autonomy of Ethics.Robert Audi - 2007 - Faith and Philosophy 24 (2):121-143.
The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers.Wes Morriston - 2009 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (1):1 - 10.
Divine Command Morality and Jewish Tradition.Avi Sagi & Daniel Statman - 1995 - Journal of Religious Ethics 23 (1):39 - 67.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads60 ( #86,770 of 2,164,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #188,554 of 2,164,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?