Stephen Maitzen
Acadia University
Often the first issue addressed by a theory of justified belief is the aim, goal, purpose, or objective of epistemic justification. What, in short, is the point of epistemic justification? Or, to put it a bit differently, why value justification: why is it worth having or pursuing? Prominent epistemologists, including both externalists and internalists, have proposed the following answer: the ultimate aim of epistemic justification is to maximize true belief and minimize false belief. This answer specifies what I’ll call the “nominal aim,” an aim that gets endorsed by a number of well-known accounts of justification. William Alston, an externalist with certain internalist scruples, is among the most explicit champions of the nominal aim
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.2307/2108337
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Justification.William Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.
Why Knowledge is Merely True Belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):167-180.
Why Knowledge Is Merely True Belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):167-180.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
XV—The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.
The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal.Igor Douven - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204-225.

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