Theism as Theory: Issues in the Epistemology of Religious Belief
Dissertation, Cornell University (
1992)
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Abstract
This essay in epistemology focuses on issues associated with belief in God, understood as belief in the existence of the God of orthodox monotheism and in the truth of related theistic claims. What type of belief is belief in God, and under what general conditions is such belief epistemically justified? I consider various answers to these questions, I offer some answers of my own, and I suggest some consequences of the latter for several important issues in the epistemology of religion. ;I defend a version of evidentialism about belief in God. I argue that theism is in essential respects a theory, making theistic belief what I call a "theoretical" belief, one sort of belief whose epistemic justification depends on the existence of evidence for the truth of the belief. This fact about theism has important consequences for, among other things: the thesis of so-called "Reformed epistemology" ; the function of epistemic probability in the acceptance of religious creeds; and the place of subjective certainty in theistic belief. I conclude by briefly discussing the epistemic impact of some important kinds of theistic and anti-theistic evidence, and I offer some further speculations about the role of religious faith in supplementing, rather than supplanting, reason