Synthese 114 (2):337-354 (1998)
The Knower Paradox has had a brief but eventful history, and principles of epistemic closure (which say that a subject automatically knows any proposition she knows to be materially implied, or logically entailed, by a proposition she already knows) have been the subject of tremendous debate in epistemic logic and epistemology more generally, especially because the fate of standard arguments for and against skepticism seems to turn on the fate of closure. As far as I can tell, however, no one working in either area has emphasized the result I emphasize in this paper: the Knower Paradox just falsifies even the most widely accepted general principles of epistemic closure. After establishing that result, I discuss five of its more important consequences.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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The Paradox of the Knower Revisited.Walter Dean & Hidenori Kurokawa - 2014 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 165 (1):199-224.
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