Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):257-280 (2005)

Authors
Sarah Sawyer
University of Sussex
Brad Majors
Baker University
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to show that the truth of content externalism can be grounded in purely epistemological considerations in which no appeal is made to Twin‐Earth style cases. Content externalism is required to provide an adequate account of perceptual warrant.
Keywords Content  Epistemology  Externalism  Internalism  Justification  Reliabilism  Perceptual warrant
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00062.x
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.

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Citations of this work BETA

Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.
Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Evil Demon Inside.Nicholas Silins - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):325-343.

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