Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (2):155 - 185 (2001)

Authors
David Makinson
London School of Economics
Abstract
In a previous paper we developed a general theory of input/output logics. These are operations resembling inference, but where inputs need not be included among outputs, and outputs need not be reusable as inputs. In the present paper we study what happens when they are constrained to render output consistent with input. This is of interest for deontic logic, where it provides a manner of handling contrary-to-duty obligations. Our procedure is to constrain the set of generators of the input/output system, considering only the maximal subsets that do not yield output conflicting with a given input. When inputs are authorised to reappear as outputs, both maxichoice revision in the sense of Alchourr6n/Makinson and the default logic of Poole emerge as special cases, and there is a close relation with Reiter default logic. However, our focus is on the general case where inputs need not be outputs. We show in what contexts the consistency of input with output may be reduced to its consistency with a truth-functional combination of components of generators, and under what conditions constrained output may be obtained by a derivation that is constrained at every step
Keywords input/output logic  contrary-to-duty obligations  deontic logic  consistency constraints  default logics  revision
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1017599526096
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References found in this work BETA

Input/Output Logics.David Makinson & Leendert van der Torre - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (4):383-408.

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Citations of this work BETA

Deontic Logic.Paul McNamara - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Modality, Weights and Inconsistent Premise Sets.Alex Silk - 2017 - Journal of Semantics 34 (4):683-707.
Permission From an Input/Output Perspective.David Makinson & Leendert van der Torre - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (4):391 - 416.

View all 35 citations / Add more citations

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