Philosophical Studies 155 (1):117-131 (2011)

Authors
Corey Maley
University of Kansas
Abstract
Representation is central to contemporary theorizing about the mind/brain. But the nature of representation--both in the mind/brain and more generally--is a source of ongoing controversy. One way of categorizing representational types is to distinguish between the analog and the digital: the received view is that analog representations vary smoothly, while digital representations vary in a step-wise manner. I argue that this characterization is inadequate to account for the ways in which representation is used in cognitive science; in its place, I suggest an alternative taxonomy. I will defend and extend David Lewis's account of analog and digital representation, distinguishing analog from continuous representation, as well as digital from discrete representation. I will argue that the distinctions available in this four-fold account accord with representational features of theoretical interest in cognitive science more usefully than the received analog/digital dichotomy.
Keywords Analog  Digital  Representation  Cognitive science
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Reprint years 2011
DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9562-8
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References found in this work BETA

Languages of Art.Nelson Goodman - 1970 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 3 (1):62-63.
Computing Mechanisms.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (4):501-526.
Analog and Digital.David K. Lewis - 1971 - Noûs 5 (3):321-327.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Number Sense Represents (Rational) Numbers.Sam Clarke & Jacob Beck - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44:1-57.
Analogue Magnitude Representations: A Philosophical Introduction.Jacob Beck - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):829-855.
Analog Representation and the Parts Principle.John Kulvicki - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (1):165-180.

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