Against Arguments from Reference

Authors
Stephen Stich
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Shaun Nichols
University of Arizona
Edouard Machery
University of Pittsburgh
1 more
Abstract
It is common in various quarters of philosophy to derive philosophically significant conclusions from theories of reference. In this paper, we argue that philosophers should give up on such 'arguments from reference.' Intuitions play a central role in establishing theories of reference, and recent cross-cultural work suggests that intuitions about reference vary across cultures and between individuals within a culture (Machery et al. 2004). We argue that accommodating this variation within a theory of reference undermines arguments from reference.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00281.x
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers.John Bengson - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference.Max Deutsch - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (4):445-466.
Against the New Metaphysics of Race.David Ludwig - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (2):244-265.

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