How necessary is the past? Reply to Campbell
Joe Campbell has identified an apparent flaw in van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument. It apparently derives a metaphysically necessary conclusion from what Campbell argues is a contingent premise: that the past is in some sense necessary. I criticise Campbell’s examples attempting to show that this is not the case (in the requisite sense) and suggest some directions along which an incompatibilist could reconstruct her argument so as to remain immune to Campbell’s worries
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Taking Simmel Seriously in Evolutionary Epistemology.Martin A. Coleman - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (1):55-74.
Reply to Campbell.David M. Armstrong - 1993 - In John Bacon, Keith Campbell & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D M Armstrong. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Space and Sense: The Role of Location in Understanding Demonstrative Concepts.Gloria Ayob - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):347-354.
Comment on Campbell.Bruce Kuklick - 2007 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 43 (2):382-385.
George Campbell's Critique of Hume on Testimony.Tony Pitson - 2006 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 4 (1):1-15.
On Visual Experience of Objects: Comments on John Campbell's Reference and Consciousness.Mohan P. Matthen - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 127 (2):195-220.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads17 ( #287,066 of 2,178,184 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #316,497 of 2,178,184 )
How can I increase my downloads?