Authors
Jeff Malpas
University of Tasmania
Abstract
Responding to criticisms raised by Christopher Norris, this paper defends an anti-relativist reading of the work of both Davidson and Heidegger arguing that that there are important lessons to be learnt from their example - one can thus be an anti-relativist (as well as a certain sort of realist) without giving up on Davidson or on Heidegger.
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DOI 10.1080/0967255042000243984
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The Structure and Content of Truth.Donald Davidson - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (6):279-328.
Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions.H. Paul Grice - 1969 - Philosophical Review 78 (2):147-177.
Three Varieties of Knowledge.Donald Davidson - 1991 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30:153-166.

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