In Amy Kind & Christopher Badura (eds.), The Epistemic Uses of Imagination. Routledge (2021)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Is imagination a source of knowledge? Timothy Williamson has recently argued that our imaginative capacities can yield knowledge of a variety of matters, spanning from everyday practical matters to logic and set theory. Furthermore, imagination for Williamson plays a similar epistemic role in cognitive processes that we would traditionally classify as either a priori or a posteriori, which he takes to indicate that the distinction itself is shallow and epistemologically fruitless. In this chapter, I aim to defend the a priori-a posteriori distinction from Williamson’s challenge by questioning his account of imagination. I distinguish two notions of imagination at play in Williamson’s account – sensory vs. belief-like imagination – and show that both face empirical and normative issues. Sensory imagination seems neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. Whereas, belief-like imagination isn’t adequately disentangled from inference. Additionally, Williamson’s examples are ad hoc and don’t generalize. I conclude that Williamson’s case against the a priori-a posteriori distinction is unconvincing, and so is the thesis that imagination is an epistemic source.
|
Keywords | A priori knowledge and justification Imagination Inference Williamson Simulation |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Buy the book |
Find it on Amazon.com
|
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
View all 34 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
On Williamson’s Armchair Philosophical Knowledge.Cong Wang & Wen-Fang Wang - forthcoming - Sophia:1-20.
Similar books and articles
How Deep is the Distinction Between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge?Timothy Williamson - 2013 - In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The A Priori in Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 291-312.
Williamsonian Scepticism About the A Priori.Giacomo Melis & Crispin Wright - forthcoming - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Beyond Sense? New Essays on the Significance, Grounds, and Extent of the A Priori.
Imagination Through Knowledge.Shannon Spaulding - 2016 - In Amy Kind & Peter Kung (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford University Press. pp. 207-226.
Kant on the Epistemic Role of the Imagination.Tobias Rosefeldt - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3171-3192.
Articulating the A Priori-A Posteriori Distinction.Albert Casullo - 2012 - In Essays on A Priori Knowledge and Justification. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 289-327.
Experience and Reasoning: Challenging the a Priori/a Posteriori Distinction.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1127-1148.
On Choosing What to Imagine.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2016 - In A. Kind & P. Kung (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford University Press. pp. 61-84.
Knowledge by Imagination - How Imaginative Experience Can Ground Knowledge.Fabiab Dorsch - forthcoming - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy.
Creative Imagining as Practical Knowing: An Akbariyya Account.Reza Hadisi - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (s):181-204.
Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):89-123.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2020-12-16
Total views
299 ( #35,436 of 2,507,121 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
94 ( #7,995 of 2,507,121 )
2020-12-16
Total views
299 ( #35,436 of 2,507,121 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
94 ( #7,995 of 2,507,121 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads