Logic of Simpson paradox

Logic and Logical Philosophy 14 (2):203-210 (2005)
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The main aim of this paper is to elucidate, from a logical point of view, the phenomenon of Simpson reversal — the paradox of a statistical reasoning. We define a binary relation of supporting in the following way: a sentence A supports a sentence B if and only if the probability of B is higher when A is true, than when A is false. It appears that a statistical argument occurring in Simpson paradox cannot be formalized by means of a binary relation. We generalize the relation of support introducing the third parameter. Then we argue that it properly mirrors main features of the statistical argument occurring in Simpson paradox



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Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
Causality.Judea Pearl - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Ernest H. Hutten - 1950 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 16 (3):205-207.

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