On the Epistemological Potential of Worrall's Structural Realism
Abstract
Structural realism à-la-Worrall is the view that inasmuch as our scientific theories
provide us with (partially) adequate descriptions of an objective and independent reality,
they do so by shedding light on the way this reality is in itself structured, and not on the
so-called nature of existing objects. This position seems to imply that there is something
about reality that lies beyond our grasp. I will reconstruct and shed new light onto Worrall’s
position and show that, contrary to how it might appear at first sight, its allegedly negative,
or pessimist stance has a positive side: by placing a constraint on our (theoretically
mediated) knowledge, structural realism might tell us something relevant about the nature
and functioning of our scientific understanding of the world. The paper is divided in three
parts. The first part is devoted to a brief reconstruction of Worrall’s position. In the second
part, I propose a new reading of the position in question by uncovering, highlighting and
developing its epistemological consequences. In the last part, I investigate and scrutinize
the connection between understanding and structures. The overall aim is to show how
Worrall’s structural realism, especially in the reading I am proposing here, may provide
us with a plausible explanation of the epistemic value of past and actual scientific theories.