Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):377-93 (2001)

Authors
Matteo Mameli
King's College London
Abstract
There are many interesting empirical and theoretical issues concerning the evolution of cognition. Despite this, recent books on the topic concentrate on two problems. One is mental modularity. The other is what distinguishes human from non-human minds. While it is easy to understand why people are interested in human uniqueness, it is not clear why modularity is the centre of attention. Fodor (2000) has a nice argument for why people _should_ be interested in modularity
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Biology   Evolutionary Biology
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Reprint years 2001
DOI 10.1023/A:1010605410437
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References found in this work BETA

Rules and Representations.Noam A. Chomsky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (127):1-61.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
Primate Cognition.Amanda Seed & Michael Tomasello - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):407-419.

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Citations of this work BETA

Mindreading, Mindshaping, and Evolution.Matteo Mameli - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (5):595-626.

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