Against alief

Philosophical Studies 165 (1):197-211 (2013)
Authors
Eric Mandelbaum
CUNY Graduate Center
Abstract
This essay attempts to clarify the nature and structure of aliefs. First I distinguish between a robust notion of aliefs and a deflated one. A robust notion of aliefs would introduce aliefs into our psychological ontology as a hitherto undiscovered kind, whereas a deflated notion of aliefs would identify aliefs as a set of pre-existing psychological states. I then propose the following dilemma: one the one hand, if aliefs have propositional content, then it is unclear exactly how aliefs differ from psychological states we already countenance, in which case there is no robust notion of aliefs; on the other, if aliefs just contain associative content, then they cannot do the explanatory work set out for them, in which case there is no reason to posit aliefs at all. Thus, it appears that we have little reason to posit the novel category of robust aliefs
Keywords Alief  Belief  Inference  Association  Propositional structure
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9930-7
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References found in this work BETA

Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.
Beliefs and Subdoxastic States.Stephen P. Stich - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (December):499-518.

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Citations of this work BETA

Thinking is Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):55-96.
Phenomenal Dispositions.Henry Ian Schiller - forthcoming - Synthese:1-12.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

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