An argument against the externalist account of psychological content

Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):375-82 (1991)
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Abstract

Abstract I first suggest some ways in which the externalist account of psychological content can be reconciled with the aspectual character of intentionality. I then give an argument against the externalist account which includes as premises the claims that a system capable of having intentional states must understand a language, and that a system that understands a language must be capable of consciousness. I defend the latter claim by arguing that a correct understanding of observation sentences requires conscious, sensory experience, and by appealing to the fact that language has meaning in a holistic manner

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Citations of this work

Does mentality entail consciousness?Rocco J. Gennaro - 1995 - Philosophia 24 (3-4):331-58.

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References found in this work

Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Science, Perception and Reality.Wilfrid Sellars (ed.) - 1963 - New York,: Humanities Press.
Content and Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 1968 - New York: Routledge.
Minds and Machines.Hilary Putnam - 1960 - In Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions Of Mind: A Symposium. NY: NEW YORK University Press. pp. 138-164.

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