An argument against the externalist account of psychological content

Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):375-82 (1991)
Abstract
Abstract I first suggest some ways in which the externalist account of psychological content can be reconciled with the aspectual character of intentionality. I then give an argument against the externalist account which includes as premises the claims that a system capable of having intentional states must understand a language, and that a system that understands a language must be capable of consciousness. I defend the latter claim by arguing that a correct understanding of observation sentences requires conscious, sensory experience, and by appealing to the fact that language has meaning in a holistic manner
Keywords Consciousness  Externalism  Intentionality  Psychology  Science
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DOI 10.1080/09515089108573037
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References found in this work BETA

Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
Science, Perception, and Reality.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - New York: Humanities Press.
Knowing One's Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.

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Does Mentality Entail Consciousness?Rocco J. Gennaro - 1995 - Philosophia 24 (3-4):331-58.

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