Analysis 79 (3):424-436 (2019)

Authors
Justin Khoo
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Matthew Mandelkern
New York University
Abstract
Bradley offers a quick and convincing argument that no Boolean semantic theory for conditionals can validate a very natural principle concerning the relationship between credences and conditionals. We argue that Bradley’s principle, Preservation, is, in fact, invalid; its appeal arises from the validity of a nearby, but distinct, principle, which we call Local Preservation, and which Boolean semantic theories can non-trivially validate.
Keywords conditionals  Preservation condition  triviality results
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DOI 10.1093/analys/any051
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References found in this work BETA

On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Citations of this work BETA

Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.
Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.
The Spectre of Triviality.Nate Charlow - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):595-605.

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