Distinction between Beliefs and Desires

Deucalion : A Journal for Philosophical Research and Critique 22 (1):21-41 (2004)
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Abstract

The paper presents a criticism of the metaphor of Direction of Fit as a criterion for beliefs/desires. It sketches an alternative account of belief/desire distinction based on Bayesian Decision Theory.

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Eleni Manolakaki
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

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References found in this work

Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In Lawrence Foster & Joe William Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. London, England: Humanities Press.
Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.

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