Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):993-994 (2001)

Riccardo Manzotti
IULM University
Sensory motor contingencies belong to a functionalistic framework. Functionalism does not explain why and how objective functional relations produce phenomenal experience. O'Regan & Noë (O&N) as well as other functionalists do not propose a new ontology that could support the first person subjective phenomenal side of experience.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x01450114
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Varieties of Consciousness.Paolo Bartolomeo & Gianfranco Dalla Barba - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):331-332.

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