Enoch’s “Taking-Morality-Seriously Thought” Unpacked and at Work in the Argument from Impartiality

Topoi 37 (4):591-602 (2018)

Authors
Giuliana Mancuso
Università degli Studi di Milano
Abstract
After a brief outline of Enoch’s defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously, I focus on Enoch’s taking-morality-seriously thought by making explicit the assumptions I see involved in it. Enoch’s argument from impartiality is then reconstructed to show how these assumptions are at work. Next, I explain the reasons why Enoch does not succeed in converting these assumptions into a positive argument for the thesis implied by robust realism that there is a moral objectivity. Finally, I conclude that the critical analysis provided casts a shadow on the reliability of the taking-morality-seriously thought as a basis of a theoretical inquiry into the nature of morality.
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-016-9449-1
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Realism, Face-Values and Presumptions.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):158-179.
Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):56–77.
The Argument From Moral Experience.Don Loeb - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):469-484.

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