Meta-Illusionism and Qualia Quietism

Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):140-148 (2016)

Authors
Pete Mandik
William Paterson University of New Jersey
Abstract
Many so-called problems in contemporary philosophy of mind depend for their expression on a collection of inter-defined technical terms, a few of which are qualia, phenomenal property, and what-it’s-like-ness. I express my scepticism about Keith Frankish’s illusionism, the view that people are generally subject to a systematic illusion that any properties are phenomenal, and scout the relative merits of two alternatives to Frankish’s illusionism. The first is phenomenal meta-illusionism, the view that illusionists such as Frankish, in holding their view, are themselves thereby under an illusion. The second is qualia quietism, the view that nothing worth saying is said by employing any of the aforementioned inter-defined technical terms.
Keywords qualia, illusionism, quietism, eliminativism, phenomenal consciousness, consciousness
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