Mental Colors, Conceptual Overlap, and Discriminating Knowledge of Particulars

Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):641-643 (2012)

Authors
Pete Mandik
William Paterson University of New Jersey
Abstract
I respond to the separate commentaries by Jacob Berger, Charlie Pelling, and David Pereplyotchik on my paper, “Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.” I resist Berger’s suggestion that mental colors ever enter consciousness without accompaniment by deployments of concepts of their extra-mental counterparts. I express concerns about Pelling’s proposal that a more uniform conceptualist treatment of phenomenal sorites can be gained by a simple appeal to the partial overlap of the extensions of some concepts. I question the relevance to perceptual consciousness of the arguments for demonstrative concepts that Pereplyotchik attacks
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2011.06.007
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References found in this work BETA

Perception and Reason.Bill Brewer - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.Pete Mandik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.
Do We Conceptualize Every Color We Consciously Discriminate?Jacob Berger - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):632-635.
Why Believe in Demonstrative Concepts?David Pereplyotchik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):636-638.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Myth of Color Sensations, or How Not to See a Yellow Banana.Pete Mandik - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):228-240.

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