No Identity Without an Entity

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):279-305 (2015)

Authors
Luke Manning
Auburn University
Abstract
Peter Geach's puzzle of intentional identity is to explain how the claim ‘Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow’ is compatible with there being no such witch. I clarify the puzzle and reduce it to the familiar problem of negative existentials. That problem is a paradox of representations that seem to include denials of commitment , to carry commitment to what they deny commitment to, and to be true. The best proposed solutions can be understood through this paradox; I evaluate them, and defend a new solution
Keywords intentional identity  Peter Geach  intentional transitive verbs  negative existentials  mythical objects  mental simulation
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12074
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Nonexistence.Nathan Salmon - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):277-319.

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Citations of this work BETA

Co‐Identification and Fictional Names.Manuel García‐Carpintero - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
(Mock-)Thinking About the Same.Alberto Voltolini - 2017 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 24:282-307.

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