Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60 (1999)

Authors
Pete Mandik
William Paterson University of New Jersey
Abstract
According to representionalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a representation is about its effects instead of its causes. I discuss conceptual and empirical points that favor a procedural representationalism for our experience of space.
Keywords Control  Experience  Qualia  Science  Sensation  Space  Dretske, F  Lycan, W  Tye, M
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DOI 10.1080/095150899105927
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References found in this work BETA

Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.
A Theory Of Perception.George Pitcher - 1971 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Molyneux's Question.Gareth Evans - 1985 - In Collected Papers. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception.Robert Briscoe - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423-460.
Pressing the Flesh: A Tension in the Study of the Embodied, Embedded Mind.Andy Clark - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):37–59.
Is Consciousness Embodied.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 419--437.

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