Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60 (1999)
According to representionalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a representation is about its effects instead of its causes. I discuss conceptual and empirical points that favor a procedural representationalism for our experience of space.
|Keywords||Control Experience Qualia Science Sensation Space Dretske, F Lycan, W Tye, M|
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References found in this work BETA
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.Michael Tye - 1995 - MIT Press.
Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader.William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.) - 2001 - Blackwell.
Citations of this work BETA
Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception.Robert Briscoe - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423-460.
Knowing What We Can Do: Actions, Intentions, and the Construction of Phenomenal Experience.Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):375-394.
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