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Thinking is Believing

Eric Mandelbaum

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):55-96 (2014) Copy BIBT_EX

Abstract

Inquiry, Volume 57, Issue 1, Page 55-96, February 2014

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Eric Mandelbaum

CUNY Graduate Center

Categories

Belief, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

Doxastic Voluntarism in Epistemology

Introspection and Introspectionism in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Negation in Philosophy of Language

The Nature of Belief in Philosophy of Mind

Thought and Thinking, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

Keywords

Belief Automaticity Rationality Belief Acquisition Cognitive Architecture Central Cognition Anchoring and Adjustment Doxastic Deliberation Introspection Negation

DOI

10.1080/0020174x.2014.858417

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Author's Profile

Eric Mandelbaum

CUNY Graduate Center

Citations of this work

Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias.Eric Mandelbaum - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):629-658.

Troubles with Bayesianism: An introduction to the psychological immune system.Eric Mandelbaum - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (2):141-157.

Seeing and Conceptualizing: Modularity and the Shallow Contents of Perception.Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):267-283.

The Fragmentation of Belief.Joseph Bendana & Eric Mandelbaum - forthcoming - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford, UK:

Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science.Jake Quilty-Dunn & Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2353-2372.

View all 69 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.

Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.

View all 69 references / Add more references