The Problem of Epistemic Luck for Naturalists

Philo 17 (1):59-76 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX


According to a (once) venerable tradition, our knowledge of the external world is crucially dependent on divine favor: our ability to obtain knowledge of the world around us is made possible by God’s having so ordered things. I argue that this view, despite its unpopularity among con­temporary philosophers, is supported by a certain inference to the best explanation: namely, it provides an effective way of reconciling two widely held beliefs that, on the assumption of naturalism, appear incompatible: (1) that knowledge is incompatible with the kind of luck present in Gettier sce­narios and (2) that arguments for external world skepticism can be effectively rebutted by “shifting” them in the style of G. E. Moore.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,991

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Does knowledge intellectualism have a Gettier problem?Keith Raymond Harris - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (59):149-159.
Skepticism Reexamined.Marin Spasov Smillov - 1997 - Dissertation, University of Florida
Knowledge with Luck.HsinMei Lin - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 75:127-131.
Externalism, Skepticism And Epistemic Luck.Živan Lazović - 2010 - Filozofija I Društvo 21 (3):89-102.
Knowledge and varieties of epistemic luck.Hamid Vahi - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):351–362.


Added to PP

55 (#298,241)

6 months
18 (#152,803)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

R. Zachary Manis
The Stony Brook School

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references