The spread mind. Is consciousness situated?"

If phenomenal experience is a physical phenomenon, it must occur at some spatial and temporal location. Can consciousness be situated in such a strong sense? Although the importance of embodiment and situatedness is often mentioned, most neuroscientists and philosophers alike consider phenomenal experience as an outcome of neural activity. In this paper, the question I would raise is whether the physical underpinnings of conscious experience may be identical with processes temporally and spatially extended beyond the boundary of the skull and the skin. The resulting model of situated consciousness is dubbed the Spread Mind. The hypothesis is verifiable empirically. The model outlines a form of vehicle phenomenal externalism more radical than Clark’s extended mind or Dretske’s content phenomenal externalism.
Keywords Consciousness  Extended Mind  Situated Cognition  Externalism  Phenomenal Experience
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,188
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
James on Experience and the Extended Mind.Joel Krueger - 2006 - Contemporary Pragmatism 3 (1):165-176.
Consciousness: The Transcendalist Manifesto.Mark Rowlands - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):205-21.
Cortical Activity and the Explanatory Gap.John G. Taylor - 1998 - Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):109-48.
Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem.Michael Tye - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.
Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

75 ( #68,008 of 2,153,858 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #76,596 of 2,153,858 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums